A game theory analysis of green infrastructure stormwater management policies

Green stormwater infrastructure has been demonstrated as an innovative water resources management approach that addresses multiple challenges facing urban environments. However, there is little consensus on what policy strategies can be used to best incentivize green infrastructure adoption by priva...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Water resources research Vol. 53; no. 9; pp. 8003 - 8019
Main Authors: William, Reshmina, Garg, Jugal, Stillwell, Ashlynn S.
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Washington John Wiley & Sons, Inc 01.09.2017
Subjects:
Downstream effects
environmental equity
Environmental justice
Frameworks
Game theory
Green infrastructure
Infrastructure
issues and policy
Mayors
Policies
politics
pollutants
Pollution control
Pollution load
Regulation
Stormwater
Stormwater management
Theories
Urban environments
Water management
Water resources
Water resources management
ISSN:0043-1397, 1944-7973
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Green stormwater infrastructure has been demonstrated as an innovative water resources management approach that addresses multiple challenges facing urban environments. However, there is little consensus on what policy strategies can be used to best incentivize green infrastructure adoption by private landowners. Game theory, an analysis framework that has historically been under‐utilized within the context of stormwater management, is uniquely suited to address this policy question. We used a cooperative game theory framework to investigate the potential impacts of different policy strategies used to incentivize green infrastructure installation. The results indicate that municipal regulation leads to the greatest reduction in pollutant loading. However, the choice of the “best” regulatory approach will depend on a variety of different factors including politics and financial considerations. Large, downstream agents have a disproportionate share of bargaining power. Results also reveal that policy impacts are highly dependent on agents' spatial position within the stormwater network, leading to important questions of social equity and environmental justice. Key Points We use a cooperative game theory framework to evaluate private landowner green infrastructure implementation Regulatory, direct grant, and stormwater fee incentive strategies are evaluated, with municipal regulation leading to the greatest pollution reduction Results show that policy impacts are highly dependent on stormwater network spatial layout
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ISSN:0043-1397
1944-7973
DOI:10.1002/2017WR021024