Explaining Imagination
Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments,...
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| Médium: | E-kniha |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
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Oxford
Oxford University Press
2020
Oxford University Press, Incorporated |
| Vydání: | 1 |
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| ISBN: | 0198815069, 9780198815068 |
| On-line přístup: | Získat plný text |
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- 7.2 Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Psychology: Three Questions about the Relation of Pretense to Imagination -- 7.3 The Metaphysical Question: What Is It to Pretend? -- 7.4 What It Is to Pretend -- 7.5 Answering the Epistemological Question -- 7.6 Summary -- 8 Pretense Part II: Psychology -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The Question of Quarantining from a Light-Duty Perspective -- 8.3 Quarantining: The Central Mistake -- 8.4 Inner Speech as Imagining? A Digression -- 8.5 Leslie's Tea Party-a More Complex Pretense -- 8.6 Conditional Reasoning during Pretense -- 8.7 Inferential Disorderliness and the Outlandish Premise -- 8.8 Cognitive Attention-Asking Ourselves Questions and Holding Propositions in Mind -- 8.9 Freedom and Pterodactyls -- 8.10 Autism and Pretense -- 8.11 Conclusion -- 9 Consuming Fictions Part I: Recovering Fictional Truths -- 9.1 Imagination and the Many Puzzles of Fiction: Plan for the Next Three Chapters -- 9.2 Understanding a Fiction-the First Puzzle -- 9.3 Imaginative Filling-in-the Second Puzzle -- 9.3.1 Sidebar on Matravers -- 9.3.2 Recovering Fictional Content through Counterfactual Reasoning -- 9.3.3 Imagery and the Development of Indeterminate Fictional Truths -- 9.4 Extracting Fictional Truths through Non-counterfactual Reasoning -- 9.5 Constraints on Fiction-related Imaginings? -- 9.6 Reconciliation with Intentionalism-the Third and Fourth Puzzles of Comprehension -- 9.7 Summary -- 10 Consuming Fictions Part II: The Operator Claim -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 The Operator Claim -- 10.3 Mapping the Territory: Three Views -- 10.4 To Which Fiction Do Your Desires Refer? Troubles for the Simple View -- 10.5 Troubles with I-desires -- 10.6 The Life-expectancy of Fiction-directed Desires -- 10.7 Imagining that, in the Fiction, p, and the Problem of Thatcher's Pearls -- 10.8 The OC's Implications
- 4 Imagistic Imagining Part II: Hybrid Structure, Multiple Attitudes, and Daydreams -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Relation of Mental Images to I-imaginings -- 4.3 The Multiple Use Thesis -- 4.4 Judgment I-imaginings -- 4.5 I-imaginings that are Desires, Decisions, and Intentions -- 4.6 On the Relation of Desire to A-imagining More Generally -- 4.7 Decision I-imaginings -- 4.8 Imaginative I-imagining? -- 4.9 Daydreams -- 4.10 Hybrid Structures Are Not Problematic -- 4.11 Recap -- 5 Conditional Reasoning Part I: Three Kinds of Conditionals and the Psychology of the Material Conditional -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Modal Epistemology? -- 5.3 Conditionals: Metaphysics and Psychology -- 5.4 The Material Conditional and Its Relation to Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals -- 5.5 The Material Conditional and Assumptions: Conditional Proof and Reductio ad Absurdum -- 5.6 Psychology and Systems of Natural Deduction -- 5.7 Conditional Proof and Reductio ad Absurdum Revisited -- 5.7.1 Conditional Proof without Assumptions -- 5.7.2 Reductio without Assumptions -- 5.8 Mental Models? -- 5.9 Summary -- 6 Conditional Reasoning Part II: Indicatives, Subjunctives, and the Ramsey Test -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Ramsey Test and Its Psychology -- 6.3 From Belief Conditions to Truth Conditions -- 6.4 A Difference for Subjunctives -- 6.5 The Ramsey Test and the Psychology of Indicative Conditionals -- 6.6 A General Argument Against the Need for Sui Generis Imaginative States in Conditional Reasoning -- 6.7 It Is Simpler to Just Use Beliefs-Considering an Example from Williamson -- 6.8 Mental Imagery and Conformations of the Brain? -- 6.9 Two Objections Considered -- 6.9.1 Would We Really Have to Copy So Much into Imagination? -- 6.9.2 Thought Experiments-Hard Cases for Me? -- 6.10 Recap -- 7 Pretense Part I: Metaphysics and Epistemology -- 7.1 Introduction
- 10.9 Immersion in the Fiction as Such? -- 10.10 Does Immersion Involve an Imaginative "Spectrum"? -- 10.11 Being Upset at the Fiction Itself, or Its Events? -- 10.12 Summary -- 11 Consuming Fictions Part III: Immersion, Emotion, and the Paradox of Fiction -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Emotional Irrelevance of What We Merely Imagine -- 11.3 The Paradox of Fiction -- 11.4 Some Background on the Paradox -- 11.5 Distinguishing the Metaphysical and Normative Puzzles -- 11.6 Solving the Normative Puzzle: False Starts -- 11.7 Believing It Is a Fiction and the Norms of Immersion -- 11.8 But None of These Things Are Happening! Summary via Objection -- 11.9 Back to the Triad -- 11.10 Summary -- 12 Creativity -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Creativity and A-imagining -- 12.3 The Easy versus the Hard Problems of Creativity -- 12.4 The Build Challenge -- 12.5 Losing the Scent-Recent Missteps in Linking (Sui Generis) Imaginings to Creativity -- 12.6 Back to the Deep Waters -- 12.7 Songwriters on Songwriting -- 12.8 Creativity and the Subconscious -- 12.9 Creativity and Associationism -- 12.10 Generative Adversarial Networks -- 12.11 The Importance of Being Earnest -- 12.12 Character, Creativity, and Conscious Dreams -- 12.13 Concluding Thoughts -- References -- Index
- Cover -- Explaining Imagination -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- 1 Explaining Imagination -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 What It Is to Imagine -- 1.3 Cats and Bats -- 1.4 Imagistic Imagining and Attitude Imagining -- 1.5 The Relation of I-imagining to A-imagining -- 1.6 Explaining in What Sense? -- 1.7 What We Do When We Imagine -- 1.8 Simple and Complex Attitudes -- 1.9 What Do I Mean by "More Basic"? -- 1.10 The Delicious Mud Pie -- 1.10.1 Imagination and Action -- 1.10.2 Imagination and the Will -- 1.10.3 Imagining What We Disbelieve -- 1.10.4 Imagination and Emotion -- 1.11 Introspection and Mental Imagery -- 1.12 More Case Studies as Prelude -- 1.12.1 Daydreaming: Imagining that I Am Rich and Famous -- 1.12.2 Pretense-a Sketch of Chapters 7 and 8 -- 1.12.3 Conditional Reasoning-a Sketch of Chapters 5 and 6 -- 1.12.4 Consuming Fiction: The Barest Sketch -- 1.13 Summary -- 2 Folk Psychology and Its Ontology -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Folk Psychological Ontologies-a Brief History -- 2.3 Heavy-Duty Ontology -- 2.4 Light-Duty Ontology -- 2.5 Heavy-Duty Incredulity about Light-Duty Dispositionalism, and Principled Agnosticism -- 2.6 Explaining Imagination for Light-Duty Theorists -- 2.6.1 Objections to this Form of Explanation, from a Light-Duty Perspective -- 2.7 Explaining Imagination for Heavy-Duty Theorists -- 2.8 Summary -- 3 Imagistic Imagining Part I: Imagery, Attitude Imagining, and Recreative Imagining -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Imagistic Imaginings and the Nature of Mental Imagery -- 3.2.1 Defining 'Mental Imagery' -- 3.3 Attitude Imaginings-Keeping the Definition Neutral -- 3.4 The Relationship between A- and I-imagining -- 3.5 A-imagining without I-imagining -- 3.6 I-imagining without A-imagining -- 3.7 Against Recreative Imagining