Explaining Imagination
Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments,...
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Oxford
Oxford University Press
2020
Oxford University Press, Incorporated |
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| ISBN: | 0198815069, 9780198815068 |
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| Abstract | Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, decisions, and intentions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, which sees imagination as an irreducible, sui generis mental state or process—one that influences our judgments, beliefs, desires, and so on, without being constituted by them. Explaining Imagination looks closely at the main contexts where imagination is thought to be at work and argues that, in each case, the capacity is best explained by appeal to a person’s beliefs, judgments, desires, intentions, or decisions. The proper conclusion is not that there are no imaginings after all, but that these other states simply constitute the relevant cases of imagining. Contexts explored in depth include: hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, engaging in pretense, appreciating fictions, and generating creative works. The special role of mental imagery within states like beliefs, desires, and judgments is explained in a way that is compatible with reducing imagination to more basic folk psychological states. A significant upshot is that, in order to create an artificial mind with an imagination, we need only give it these more ordinary mental states. |
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| AbstractList | This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.Imagination will remain a mystery-we will not be able to explain imagination-until we can break it into parts we already understand. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the parts are other ordinary mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, and decisions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, according to whichimagination is a sui generis mental state or process-one with its own inscrutable principles of operation. Explaining Imagination upends that view, showing how, on closer inspection, the imaginings at work in hypothetical reasoning, pretense, the enjoyment of fiction, and creativity are reducible to other familiarmental states-judgments, beliefs, desires, and decisions among them. Crisscrossing contemporary philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and aesthetics, Explaining Imagination argues that a clearer understanding of imagination is already well within reach. Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, decisions, and intentions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, which sees imagination as an irreducible, sui generis mental state or process—one that influences our judgments, beliefs, desires, and so on, without being constituted by them. Explaining Imagination looks closely at the main contexts where imagination is thought to be at work and argues that, in each case, the capacity is best explained by appeal to a person’s beliefs, judgments, desires, intentions, or decisions. The proper conclusion is not that there are no imaginings after all, but that these other states simply constitute the relevant cases of imagining. Contexts explored in depth include: hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, engaging in pretense, appreciating fictions, and generating creative works. The special role of mental imagery within states like beliefs, desires, and judgments is explained in a way that is compatible with reducing imagination to more basic folk psychological states. A significant upshot is that, in order to create an artificial mind with an imagination, we need only give it these more ordinary mental states. Imagination will remain a mystery--we will not be able to explain imagination--until we can break it into parts we already understand. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the parts are other ordinary mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, and decisions. |
| Author | Langland-Hassan, Peter |
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| Keywords | folk psychology imagine fiction pretense imagination conditionals creativity reduction beliefs mental imagery |
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| Snippet | Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood.... Imagination will remain a mystery--we will not be able to explain imagination--until we can break it into parts we already understand. Explaining Imagination... This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered... |
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| SubjectTerms | beliefs Cognition and cognitive psychology conditionals creativity fiction folk psychology Imagination Imagination (Philosophy) imagine mental imagery Philosophy Philosophy and Religion Philosophy of Mind Philosophy: aesthetics pretense Psychology reduction Society and Social Sciences Topics in philosophy |
| TableOfContents | 7.2 Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Psychology: Three Questions about the Relation of Pretense to Imagination -- 7.3 The Metaphysical Question: What Is It to Pretend? -- 7.4 What It Is to Pretend -- 7.5 Answering the Epistemological Question -- 7.6 Summary -- 8 Pretense Part II: Psychology -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The Question of Quarantining from a Light-Duty Perspective -- 8.3 Quarantining: The Central Mistake -- 8.4 Inner Speech as Imagining? A Digression -- 8.5 Leslie's Tea Party-a More Complex Pretense -- 8.6 Conditional Reasoning during Pretense -- 8.7 Inferential Disorderliness and the Outlandish Premise -- 8.8 Cognitive Attention-Asking Ourselves Questions and Holding Propositions in Mind -- 8.9 Freedom and Pterodactyls -- 8.10 Autism and Pretense -- 8.11 Conclusion -- 9 Consuming Fictions Part I: Recovering Fictional Truths -- 9.1 Imagination and the Many Puzzles of Fiction: Plan for the Next Three Chapters -- 9.2 Understanding a Fiction-the First Puzzle -- 9.3 Imaginative Filling-in-the Second Puzzle -- 9.3.1 Sidebar on Matravers -- 9.3.2 Recovering Fictional Content through Counterfactual Reasoning -- 9.3.3 Imagery and the Development of Indeterminate Fictional Truths -- 9.4 Extracting Fictional Truths through Non-counterfactual Reasoning -- 9.5 Constraints on Fiction-related Imaginings? -- 9.6 Reconciliation with Intentionalism-the Third and Fourth Puzzles of Comprehension -- 9.7 Summary -- 10 Consuming Fictions Part II: The Operator Claim -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 The Operator Claim -- 10.3 Mapping the Territory: Three Views -- 10.4 To Which Fiction Do Your Desires Refer? Troubles for the Simple View -- 10.5 Troubles with I-desires -- 10.6 The Life-expectancy of Fiction-directed Desires -- 10.7 Imagining that, in the Fiction, p, and the Problem of Thatcher's Pearls -- 10.8 The OC's Implications 4 Imagistic Imagining Part II: Hybrid Structure, Multiple Attitudes, and Daydreams -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Relation of Mental Images to I-imaginings -- 4.3 The Multiple Use Thesis -- 4.4 Judgment I-imaginings -- 4.5 I-imaginings that are Desires, Decisions, and Intentions -- 4.6 On the Relation of Desire to A-imagining More Generally -- 4.7 Decision I-imaginings -- 4.8 Imaginative I-imagining? -- 4.9 Daydreams -- 4.10 Hybrid Structures Are Not Problematic -- 4.11 Recap -- 5 Conditional Reasoning Part I: Three Kinds of Conditionals and the Psychology of the Material Conditional -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Modal Epistemology? -- 5.3 Conditionals: Metaphysics and Psychology -- 5.4 The Material Conditional and Its Relation to Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals -- 5.5 The Material Conditional and Assumptions: Conditional Proof and Reductio ad Absurdum -- 5.6 Psychology and Systems of Natural Deduction -- 5.7 Conditional Proof and Reductio ad Absurdum Revisited -- 5.7.1 Conditional Proof without Assumptions -- 5.7.2 Reductio without Assumptions -- 5.8 Mental Models? -- 5.9 Summary -- 6 Conditional Reasoning Part II: Indicatives, Subjunctives, and the Ramsey Test -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Ramsey Test and Its Psychology -- 6.3 From Belief Conditions to Truth Conditions -- 6.4 A Difference for Subjunctives -- 6.5 The Ramsey Test and the Psychology of Indicative Conditionals -- 6.6 A General Argument Against the Need for Sui Generis Imaginative States in Conditional Reasoning -- 6.7 It Is Simpler to Just Use Beliefs-Considering an Example from Williamson -- 6.8 Mental Imagery and Conformations of the Brain? -- 6.9 Two Objections Considered -- 6.9.1 Would We Really Have to Copy So Much into Imagination? -- 6.9.2 Thought Experiments-Hard Cases for Me? -- 6.10 Recap -- 7 Pretense Part I: Metaphysics and Epistemology -- 7.1 Introduction 10.9 Immersion in the Fiction as Such? -- 10.10 Does Immersion Involve an Imaginative "Spectrum"? -- 10.11 Being Upset at the Fiction Itself, or Its Events? -- 10.12 Summary -- 11 Consuming Fictions Part III: Immersion, Emotion, and the Paradox of Fiction -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Emotional Irrelevance of What We Merely Imagine -- 11.3 The Paradox of Fiction -- 11.4 Some Background on the Paradox -- 11.5 Distinguishing the Metaphysical and Normative Puzzles -- 11.6 Solving the Normative Puzzle: False Starts -- 11.7 Believing It Is a Fiction and the Norms of Immersion -- 11.8 But None of These Things Are Happening! Summary via Objection -- 11.9 Back to the Triad -- 11.10 Summary -- 12 Creativity -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Creativity and A-imagining -- 12.3 The Easy versus the Hard Problems of Creativity -- 12.4 The Build Challenge -- 12.5 Losing the Scent-Recent Missteps in Linking (Sui Generis) Imaginings to Creativity -- 12.6 Back to the Deep Waters -- 12.7 Songwriters on Songwriting -- 12.8 Creativity and the Subconscious -- 12.9 Creativity and Associationism -- 12.10 Generative Adversarial Networks -- 12.11 The Importance of Being Earnest -- 12.12 Character, Creativity, and Conscious Dreams -- 12.13 Concluding Thoughts -- References -- Index Cover -- Explaining Imagination -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- 1 Explaining Imagination -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 What It Is to Imagine -- 1.3 Cats and Bats -- 1.4 Imagistic Imagining and Attitude Imagining -- 1.5 The Relation of I-imagining to A-imagining -- 1.6 Explaining in What Sense? -- 1.7 What We Do When We Imagine -- 1.8 Simple and Complex Attitudes -- 1.9 What Do I Mean by "More Basic"? -- 1.10 The Delicious Mud Pie -- 1.10.1 Imagination and Action -- 1.10.2 Imagination and the Will -- 1.10.3 Imagining What We Disbelieve -- 1.10.4 Imagination and Emotion -- 1.11 Introspection and Mental Imagery -- 1.12 More Case Studies as Prelude -- 1.12.1 Daydreaming: Imagining that I Am Rich and Famous -- 1.12.2 Pretense-a Sketch of Chapters 7 and 8 -- 1.12.3 Conditional Reasoning-a Sketch of Chapters 5 and 6 -- 1.12.4 Consuming Fiction: The Barest Sketch -- 1.13 Summary -- 2 Folk Psychology and Its Ontology -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Folk Psychological Ontologies-a Brief History -- 2.3 Heavy-Duty Ontology -- 2.4 Light-Duty Ontology -- 2.5 Heavy-Duty Incredulity about Light-Duty Dispositionalism, and Principled Agnosticism -- 2.6 Explaining Imagination for Light-Duty Theorists -- 2.6.1 Objections to this Form of Explanation, from a Light-Duty Perspective -- 2.7 Explaining Imagination for Heavy-Duty Theorists -- 2.8 Summary -- 3 Imagistic Imagining Part I: Imagery, Attitude Imagining, and Recreative Imagining -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Imagistic Imaginings and the Nature of Mental Imagery -- 3.2.1 Defining 'Mental Imagery' -- 3.3 Attitude Imaginings-Keeping the Definition Neutral -- 3.4 The Relationship between A- and I-imagining -- 3.5 A-imagining without I-imagining -- 3.6 I-imagining without A-imagining -- 3.7 Against Recreative Imagining |
| Title | Explaining Imagination |
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