Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions

Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among the items. However, expressing oneýs preferences can require bidding on all bundles. We evaluate an approach known as inc...

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Vydáno v:Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Proceedings, 3rd International Joint Conference, New York City, New York, 2004. s. 386 - 393
Hlavní autoři: Hudson, Benoit, Sandholm, Tuomas
Médium: Konferenční příspěvek
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Washington, DC, USA IEEE Computer Society 19.07.2004
IEEE
Edice:ACM Conferences
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ISBN:9781581138641, 1581138644
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Shrnutí:Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among the items. However, expressing oneýs preferences can require bidding on all bundles. We evaluate an approach known as incremental preference elicitation [3] and show that as the number of items increases, the amount of information required to clear the auction is a vanishing fraction of the information collected in direct revelation mechanisms. Most of the elicitors also maintain the benefit as the number of agents increases. We prove that randomization helps, in that no deterministic elicitor is a universal revelation reducer. Finally, we present a new query type that allows agents to use anytime algorithms to give approximate answers that are refined only as needed.
Bibliografie:SourceType-Conference Papers & Proceedings-1
ObjectType-Conference Paper-1
content type line 25
ISBN:9781581138641
1581138644
DOI:10.5555/1018409.1018771