Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions

Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among the items. However, expressing oneýs preferences can require bidding on all bundles. We evaluate an approach known as inc...

Celý popis

Uložené v:
Podrobná bibliografia
Vydané v:Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Proceedings, 3rd International Joint Conference, New York City, New York, 2004. s. 386 - 393
Hlavní autori: Hudson, Benoit, Sandholm, Tuomas
Médium: Konferenčný príspevok..
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: Washington, DC, USA IEEE Computer Society 19.07.2004
IEEE
Edícia:ACM Conferences
Predmet:
Applied computing > Law, social and behavioral sciences > Economics
Computer science
Computing methodologies > Artificial intelligence > Distributed artificial intelligence > Intelligent agents
Content addressable storage
Cost accounting
Electronic commerce
Engineering profession
Marketing and sales
Mathematics of computing > Discrete mathematics > Combinatorics > Combinatorial algorithms
Pricing
Privacy
Writing
ISBN:9781581138641, 1581138644
On-line prístup:Získať plný text
Tagy: Pridať tag
Žiadne tagy, Buďte prvý, kto otaguje tento záznam!
Abstract Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among the items. However, expressing oneýs preferences can require bidding on all bundles. We evaluate an approach known as incremental preference elicitation [3] and show that as the number of items increases, the amount of information required to clear the auction is a vanishing fraction of the information collected in direct revelation mechanisms. Most of the elicitors also maintain the benefit as the number of agents increases. We prove that randomization helps, in that no deterministic elicitor is a universal revelation reducer. Finally, we present a new query type that allows agents to use anytime algorithms to give approximate answers that are refined only as needed.
AbstractList Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among the items. However, expressing oneys preferences can require bidding on all bundles. We evaluate an approach known as incremental preference elicitation [3] and show that as the number of items increases, the amount of information required to clear the auction is a vanishing fraction of the information collected in direct revelation mechanisms. Most of the elicitors also maintain the benefit as the number of agents increases. We prove that randomization helps, in that no deterministic elicitor is a universal revelation reducer. Finally, we present a new query type that allows agents to use anytime algorithms to give approximate answers that are refined only as needed.
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among the items. However, expressing oneýs preferences can require bidding on all bundles. We evaluate an approach known as incremental preference elicitation [3] and show that as the number of items increases, the amount of information required to clear the auction is a vanishing fraction of the information collected in direct revelation mechanisms. Most of the elicitors also maintain the benefit as the number of agents increases. We prove that randomization helps, in that no deterministic elicitor is a universal revelation reducer. Finally, we present a new query type that allows agents to use anytime algorithms to give approximate answers that are refined only as needed.
Author Sandholm, Tuomas
Hudson, Benoit
Author_xml – sequence: 1
  givenname: Benoit
  surname: Hudson
  fullname: Hudson, Benoit
  organization: Carnegie Mellon University
– sequence: 2
  givenname: Tuomas
  surname: Sandholm
  fullname: Sandholm, Tuomas
  organization: Carnegie Mellon University
BookMark eNqNULtOwzAUtQRIQOnMwOIJsbT4Jk7sjFVVHlIlilRWLDu5lgypXewEqX9PovYDOMvRvecxnGty7oNHQm6BzYsBj8BAclbNRxYCzsi0EhIKCZDLksMlmab0xQbwAniWXZHPlbVYd-4XPaZEg6XvPcYD3R72mKj2Dd2E1tVuOGyIdBPRYkRfI12N7053LnjqPF2GnXFedyE63dJFX49CuiEXVrcJpyeekI-n1Xb5Mlu_Pb8uF-uZhgq6mRS8ySxya60RvDS8Yg1gY4xAnkNVlNpwWTKreVFZxrRoGs5zba2UhptM5xNyf-zdx_DTY-rUzqUa21Z7DH1SOYAoS1YNxruj0SGi2ke30_GgIBd5wbJBnR9VXe-UCeE7KWBqXFadllWnZZWJDu0QePhnIP8Dimp7TQ
ContentType Conference Proceeding
DBID 6IE
6IL
CBEJK
RIE
RIL
7SC
8FD
JQ2
L7M
L~C
L~D
DOI 10.5555/1018409.1018771
DatabaseName IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings
IEEE Xplore POP ALL
IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings
IEEE Xplore
IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP All) 1998-Present
Computer and Information Systems Abstracts
Technology Research Database
ProQuest Computer Science Collection
Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace
Computer and Information Systems Abstracts – Academic
Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Professional
DatabaseTitle Computer and Information Systems Abstracts
Technology Research Database
Computer and Information Systems Abstracts – Academic
Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace
ProQuest Computer Science Collection
Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Professional
DatabaseTitleList Computer and Information Systems Abstracts
Database_xml – sequence: 1
  dbid: RIE
  name: IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)
  url: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
  sourceTypes: Publisher
DeliveryMethod fulltext_linktorsrc
Discipline Computer Science
EndPage 393
ExternalDocumentID 1373502
Genre orig-research
Conference Paper
GroupedDBID 6IE
6IK
6IL
AAJGR
AAVQY
ACM
ADPZR
ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS
APO
BEFXN
BFFAM
BGNUA
BKEBE
BPEOZ
CBEJK
GUFHI
OCL
RIB
RIC
RIE
RIL
AAWTH
LHSKQ
7SC
8FD
JQ2
L7M
L~C
L~D
ID FETCH-LOGICAL-a191t-874d2fe4fffb746b490d1edbb7e431956ab4860fa459f00a7dd443aff88b4b2a3
IEDL.DBID RIE
ISBN 9781581138641
1581138644
IngestDate Fri Jul 11 00:23:25 EDT 2025
Tue Aug 26 18:16:55 EDT 2025
Wed Jan 31 06:47:20 EST 2024
Wed Jan 31 06:44:12 EST 2024
IsPeerReviewed false
IsScholarly false
Language English
LinkModel DirectLink
MeetingName AAMAS04: The Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2004
MergedId FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-a191t-874d2fe4fffb746b490d1edbb7e431956ab4860fa459f00a7dd443aff88b4b2a3
Notes SourceType-Conference Papers & Proceedings-1
ObjectType-Conference Paper-1
content type line 25
PQID 31176609
PQPubID 23500
PageCount 8
ParticipantIDs ieee_primary_1373502
proquest_miscellaneous_31176609
acm_books_10_5555_1018409_1018771
acm_books_10_5555_1018409_1018771_brief
PublicationCentury 2000
PublicationDate 20040719
20040000
20040701
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD 2004-07-19
2004-01-01
2004-07-01
PublicationDate_xml – month: 07
  year: 2004
  text: 20040719
  day: 19
PublicationDecade 2000
PublicationPlace Washington, DC, USA
PublicationPlace_xml – name: Washington, DC, USA
PublicationSeriesTitle ACM Conferences
PublicationTitle Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Proceedings, 3rd International Joint Conference, New York City, New York, 2004.
PublicationTitleAbbrev AAMAS
PublicationYear 2004
Publisher IEEE Computer Society
IEEE
Publisher_xml – name: IEEE Computer Society
– name: IEEE
SSID ssj0000451422
Score 1.4063499
Snippet Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and...
SourceID proquest
ieee
acm
SourceType Aggregation Database
Publisher
StartPage 386
SubjectTerms Applied computing -- Law, social and behavioral sciences -- Economics
Computer science
Computing methodologies -- Artificial intelligence -- Distributed artificial intelligence -- Intelligent agents
Content addressable storage
Cost accounting
Electronic commerce
Engineering profession
Marketing and sales
Mathematics of computing -- Discrete mathematics -- Combinatorics -- Combinatorial algorithms
Pricing
Privacy
Writing
Title Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
URI https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1373502
https://www.proquest.com/docview/31176609
hasFullText 1
inHoldings 1
isFullTextHit
isPrint
link http://cvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwlV1LS8QwEB5UPHjyjeszguDFah_ZJjmLiyfxoODJkDQT2INd2e4K_ntn2u56UBB7akMKIZNk8k0y3wdwkaNRVVr4RJfRJ9JgmZiYc7K7KQPZ3wTtWrEJ9fCgX17M4wpcLXNhELG9fIbX_Nqe5YdJNedQ2U1WqGLIzJGrSqkuV2sZT2GeFJkz8MqGOssKTY6-p3RafGcdtc-QnhsmqiJow-BVK86fX3XVW6-w8mNZbn3NaPN_rdyCve-kPfG4dEfbsIL1DmwuVBtEP4l34bUjLO5XOTGJgtow_RQcjG2Eq4Ng4Qaq3Qja0Ir3pRCJQC7uju7FuBY0VglWM2inMSxcR0Pb7MHz6O7p9j7pVRYSR1htRsuhDHlEGWP0SpZemjRkGLxXSJsLgk_Os1BVdHJoYpo6FYKUhYtRay997op9WKsnNR6AkITMjUQlq8rINBSa_GIaZZ7x1ixiOYBz6mXL8KGxhD7YEra3hO0tMYDLP-tYPx1jHMAud75972g5bN_vAzhbWM_SVOHzD1fjZN7YImM2zNQc_v7jEWx013I4vnIMa7PpHE9gvfqYjZvpaTvavgAXNc4P
linkProvider IEEE
linkToHtml http://cvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwlV3PS-QwFH64KuhJXRVHV82C4MVqf6RtchZFUQcPCp4MSfMCc7Aj0xlh__t9r-2MhxVke2pDCiEvycv3kvd9ACcp6rKKMxepIrhIaiwiHVJOdteFJ_trr2wrNlEOh-rlRT8uwdkiFwYR28tneM6v7Vm-H1czDpVdJFmZ5cwcuZJLmSZdttYiosJMKTJl6JXkKkkyRa6-J3WafycduU9OzwVTVRG4YfiqSs6g_2Grt15j5Z-FufU21xv_185N2PlM2xOPC4e0BUtY_4SNuW6D6KfxNrx2lMX9OifGQVAbJn8Eh2MbYWsvWLqBajeCtrTifSFFIpCLu8N7MaoFjVYC1gzbaRQL2xHRNjvwfH31dHkT9ToLkSW0NqUFUfo0oAwhuFIWTurYJ-idK5G2FwSgrGOpqmBlrkMc29J7KTMbglJOutRmu7Bcj2vcAyEJm2uJpawqLWOfKfKMcSBb8eYsYDGA39TLhgFEYwh_sCVMbwnTW2IAp9_WMW4ywjCAbe58894Rc5i-3wdwPLeeocnCJyC2xvGsMVnCfJix3v_6x2NYu3l6uDf3t8O7A1jvLulwtOUXLE8nMzyE1epjOmomR-3I-wv8bdFW
openUrl ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=proceeding&rft.title=Proceedings+of+the+Third+International+Joint+Conference+on+Autonomous+Agents+and+Multiagent+Systems+-+Volume+1&rft.atitle=Effectiveness+of+Query+Types+and+Policies+for+Preference+Elicitation+in+Combinatorial+Auctions&rft.au=Hudson%2C+Benoit&rft.au=Sandholm%2C+Tuomas&rft.series=ACM+Conferences&rft.date=2004-07-19&rft.pub=IEEE+Computer+Society&rft.isbn=9781581138641&rft.spage=386&rft.epage=393&rft_id=info:doi/10.5555%2F1018409.1018771
thumbnail_l http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=9781581138641/lc.gif&client=summon&freeimage=true
thumbnail_m http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=9781581138641/mc.gif&client=summon&freeimage=true
thumbnail_s http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=9781581138641/sc.gif&client=summon&freeimage=true