Incorporating Trust into Combinatorial Auctions What Does Trust Cost?

As the use of automated negotiations becomes more mainstream, one key attribute that needs to be incorporated is a measure of a seller's trust or reliability. In this paper, we describe a combinatorial auction mechanism that allows buyers to specify their preferences over both an item and the s...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 03 Vol. 3; pp. 607 - 613
Main Authors: Airy, Guruprasad, Chen, Po-Chun, Mullen, Tracy, Yen, John
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Published: Washington, DC, USA IEEE Computer Society 15.09.2009
IEEE
Series:ACM Conferences
Subjects:
Applied computing > Operations research > Decision analysis
combinatorial auctions
Computing methodologies > Modeling and simulation > Model development and analysis
Conferences
Costs
Educational institutions
Human-centered computing > Collaborative and social computing > Collaborative and social computing systems and tools
Human-centered computing > Human computer interaction (HCI) > Interaction paradigms > Web-based interaction
Information systems > Information retrieval > Search engine architectures and scalability > Peer-to-peer retrieval
Information systems > Information systems applications > Decision support systems
Information systems > World Wide Web > Web searching and information discovery
Intelligent agent
Mathematics of computing > Discrete mathematics > Combinatorics > Combinatorial algorithms
Radio spectrum management
Resource management
resource sharing
Social and professional topics > Computing > technology policy > Government technology policy
Supply chain management
Supply chains
trust
USA Councils
Wireless communication
trust
combinatorial auctions
resource sharing
ISBN:0769538010, 9780769538013
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:As the use of automated negotiations becomes more mainstream, one key attribute that needs to be incorporated is a measure of a seller's trust or reliability. In this paper, we describe a combinatorial auction mechanism that allows buyers to specify their preferences over both an item and the seller's trustworthiness, and use it to generate a bid for a bundle of items. We consider some implications of generating a combined trust rating for a bundle of resources that are supplied by more than one seller. We show that allowing buyers to specify trust preferences leads to a higher overall utility and task completion rate than when compared with a model that does not consider seller trustworthiness.
ISBN:0769538010
9780769538013
DOI:10.1109/WI-IAT.2009.360