Total Collapse: The Case Against Responsibility and Morality

This book argues that there is no morality and that people are not morally responsible for what they do. In particular, it argues that what people do is neither right nor wrong and that they are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy for doing it. Morality and moral responsibility lie at the heart of...

Celý popis

Uloženo v:
Podrobná bibliografie
Hlavní autor: Kershnar, Stephen (Autor)
Médium: Elektronický zdroj E-kniha
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2018.
Vydání:1st ed. 2018.
Témata:
ISBN:9783319769509
On-line přístup: Získat plný text
Tagy: Přidat tag
Žádné tagy, Buďte první, kdo vytvoří štítek k tomuto záznamu!

MARC

LEADER 00000nam a22000005i 4500
003 SK-BrCVT
005 20220618102744.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 180329s2018 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 |a 9783319769509 
024 7 |a 10.1007/978-3-319-76950-9  |2 doi 
035 |a CVTIDW14802 
040 |a Springer-Nature  |b eng  |c CVTISR  |e AACR2 
041 |a eng 
100 1 |a Kershnar, Stephen.  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Total Collapse: The Case Against Responsibility and Morality  |h [electronic resource] /  |c by Stephen Kershnar. 
250 |a 1st ed. 2018. 
260 1 |a Cham :  |b Springer International Publishing,  |c 2018. 
300 |a XIII, 193 p.  |b online resource. 
500 |a Religion and Philosophy  
505 0 |a 1 Introduction -- Part I; No Non-Consequentialist Morality -- 2 How Consent Works -- 3 Problems with Forfeiture -- 4 Against Proportionality: Proportionality is Not a Side-Constraint on Punishment -- 5 Rights Fail and Why This Explains the Other Failures -- Part II; Why There is no non-consequentialist morality -- 6 No responsibility (Responsibility and Foundationalism) -- 7 If There Were Responsibility, It Wouldn't Do Much Work (Responsibility and Internalism) -- 8 No Responsibility No Morality -- 9 Responsibility Revisionists and Skeptics -- 10 Appendix One: What is Moral Responsibility? -- 11 Appendix Two: God is Not Morally Responsible. . 
516 |a text file PDF 
520 |a This book argues that there is no morality and that people are not morally responsible for what they do. In particular, it argues that what people do is neither right nor wrong and that they are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy for doing it. Morality and moral responsibility lie at the heart of how we view the world. In our daily life, we feel that people act rightly or wrongly, make the world better or worse, and are virtuous or vicious. These policies are central to our justifying how we see the world and treat others. In this book, the author argues that our views on these matters are false. He presents a series of arguments that threaten to undermine our theoretical and practical worldviews. The philosophical costs of denying moral responsibility and morality are enormous. It does violence to philosophical positions that many people took a lifetime to develop. Worse, it does violence to our everyday view of people. A host of concepts that we rely on daily (praiseworthy, blameworthy, desert, virtue, right, wrong, good, bad, etc.) fail to refer to any property in the world and are thus deeply mistaken. This book is of interest to philosophers, lawyers, and humanities professors as well as people interested in morality, law, religion, and public policy. . 
650 0 |a Ethics. 
650 0 |a Religion and sociology. 
856 4 0 |u http://hanproxy.cvtisr.sk/han/cvti-ebook-springer-eisbn-978-3-319-76950-9  |y Vzdialený prístup pre registrovaných používateľov 
910 |b ZE12082 
919 |a 978-3-319-76950-9 
974 |a andrea.lebedova  |f Elektronické zdroje 
992 |a SUD 
999 |c 242380  |d 242380