Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes /

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting P...

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Hlavní autor: Felsenthal, Dan S. (Autor)
Médium: Elektronický zdroj E-kniha
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2018.
Vydání:1st ed. 2018.
Edice:SpringerBriefs in Economics,
Témata:
Welfare economics.
Elections.
Political philosophy.
Economic theory.
Democracy.
ISBN:9783319740331
ISSN:2191-5504
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Obsah:
  • Introduction
  • Voting Paradoxes
  • Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate
  • The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes
  • The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes
  • The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes
  • Summary.

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