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A Two-Tier Sandbox Architecture to Enforce Modular Fine-Grained Security Policies for Untrusted JavaScript

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Titel: A Two-Tier Sandbox Architecture to Enforce Modular Fine-Grained Security Policies for Untrusted JavaScript
Autoren: Phung, Phu, 1979
Schlagwörter: self-protecting JavaScript, ECMAScript 5, mashup security, sandbox, Untruste JavaScript
Beschreibung: Existing approaches to providing security for untrusted JavaScript include isolation of capabilities -- a.k.a. sandboxing. Features of the JavaScript language conspire to make this nontrivial, and isolation normally requires complex filtering, transforming and wrapping untrusted code to restrict the code to a manageable subset. The latest JavaScript specification (ECMAScript 5) has been modified to make sandboxing easier and more widely applicable. This is illustrated in a sandboxing library recently developed by the Google Caja Team which allows untrusted code to interact with a restricted API.However, specifying and enforcing fine-grained policies within an API implementation is complex and inflexible, since each sandboxed application (there may be several within a single web page) may need an application-specific policy. In this paper, we present a two-tier architecture for sandboxed code which combines a baseline sandbox with a stateful fine-grained policy specified in an aspect-oriented programming style. The implementation of the fine-grained policy part is an adaptation of lightweight self-protecting JavaScript mechanism proposed by Phung at el (ASIACCS'09). This enforcement mechanism allows the policies to be defined in a modular way so that, for example, different policies can be specified and enforced for different untrusted applications within the same page. The mechanism is realized as a JavaScript library, so that it does not require a modified browser and untrusted code can be dynamically loaded and executed without run-time checking or transformation. We show the effectiveness of the mechanism by deploying some case studies and analyzing their security features.
Zugangs-URL: https://research.chalmers.se/publication/146091
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Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: A Two-Tier Sandbox Architecture to Enforce Modular Fine-Grained Security Policies for Untrusted JavaScript
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Phung%2C+Phu%22">Phung, Phu</searchLink>, 1979
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  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22self-protecting+JavaScript%22">self-protecting JavaScript</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22ECMAScript+5%22">ECMAScript 5</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22mashup+security%22">mashup security</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22sandbox%22">sandbox</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Untruste+JavaScript%22">Untruste JavaScript</searchLink>
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  Label: Description
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  Data: Existing approaches to providing security for untrusted JavaScript include isolation of capabilities -- a.k.a. sandboxing. Features of the JavaScript language conspire to make this nontrivial, and isolation normally requires complex filtering, transforming and wrapping untrusted code to restrict the code to a manageable subset. The latest JavaScript specification (ECMAScript 5) has been modified to make sandboxing easier and more widely applicable. This is illustrated in a sandboxing library recently developed by the Google Caja Team which allows untrusted code to interact with a restricted API.However, specifying and enforcing fine-grained policies within an API implementation is complex and inflexible, since each sandboxed application (there may be several within a single web page) may need an application-specific policy. In this paper, we present a two-tier architecture for sandboxed code which combines a baseline sandbox with a stateful fine-grained policy specified in an aspect-oriented programming style. The implementation of the fine-grained policy part is an adaptation of lightweight self-protecting JavaScript mechanism proposed by Phung at el (ASIACCS'09). This enforcement mechanism allows the policies to be defined in a modular way so that, for example, different policies can be specified and enforced for different untrusted applications within the same page. The mechanism is realized as a JavaScript library, so that it does not require a modified browser and untrusted code can be dynamically loaded and executed without run-time checking or transformation. We show the effectiveness of the mechanism by deploying some case studies and analyzing their security features.
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RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: self-protecting JavaScript
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: ECMAScript 5
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: mashup security
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: sandbox
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Untruste JavaScript
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: A Two-Tier Sandbox Architecture to Enforce Modular Fine-Grained Security Policies for Untrusted JavaScript
        Type: main
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          Name:
            NameFull: Phung, Phu
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          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2011
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