Hafnium and the zero-day dilemma. Public-private cyber threat intelligence cooperation
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| Title: | Hafnium and the zero-day dilemma. Public-private cyber threat intelligence cooperation |
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| Authors: | Mihai OLTEANU |
| Source: | Bulletin of "Carol I" National Defense University, Vol 14, Iss 3 (2025) |
| Publisher Information: | Carol I National Defence University Publishing House, 2025. |
| Publication Year: | 2025 |
| Collection: | LCC:Military Science LCC:International relations |
| Subject Terms: | Cyber Threat Intelligence, Hafnium, Zero-day Vulnerabilities, Public-private Cooperation., Military Science, International relations, JZ2-6530 |
| Description: | Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) plays a crucial role in limiting cybersecurity risks, with a particular focus on identifying and mitigating zero-day vulnerabilities. While academic literature, specialized reports, and normative documents widely argue in favor of cooperation between public and private entities to develop cybersecurity, significant systemic challenges hinder effective intelligence sharing when discussing real-time threats, such as zero-day vulnerabilities. This article critically examines the dynamics of public-private collaboration in CTI, focusing on the obstacles preventing further development of the level of cooperation, such as trust deficits, legal constraints, financial and reputational risks, and diverging strategic interests. By performing a qualitative analysis on the existing literature and using the Hafnium cyberattack as a case study, the research highlights the complexities surrounding the zero-day vulnerability disclosures and the limitations of existing cooperative frameworks. The findings indicate that while structured CTI-sharing mechanisms exist, real-time collaboration on zero-day vulnerabilities remains constrained by competing incentives that are unlikely to be properly addressed. |
| Document Type: | article |
| File Description: | electronic resource |
| Language: | English |
| ISSN: | 2284-936X 2284-9378 |
| Relation: | https://revista.unap.ro/index.php/bulletin/article/view/2241; https://doaj.org/toc/2284-936X; https://doaj.org/toc/2284-9378 |
| DOI: | 10.53477/2284-9378-25-52 |
| Access URL: | https://doaj.org/article/138dbfc722a24a53b4090b073118a07d |
| Accession Number: | edsdoj.138dbfc722a24a53b4090b073118a07d |
| Database: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science | Abstract: | Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) plays a crucial role in limiting cybersecurity risks, with a particular focus on identifying and mitigating zero-day vulnerabilities. While academic literature, specialized reports, and normative documents widely argue in favor of cooperation between public and private entities to develop cybersecurity, significant systemic challenges hinder effective intelligence sharing when discussing real-time threats, such as zero-day vulnerabilities. This article critically examines the dynamics of public-private collaboration in CTI, focusing on the obstacles preventing further development of the level of cooperation, such as trust deficits, legal constraints, financial and reputational risks, and diverging strategic interests. By performing a qualitative analysis on the existing literature and using the Hafnium cyberattack as a case study, the research highlights the complexities surrounding the zero-day vulnerability disclosures and the limitations of existing cooperative frameworks. The findings indicate that while structured CTI-sharing mechanisms exist, real-time collaboration on zero-day vulnerabilities remains constrained by competing incentives that are unlikely to be properly addressed. |
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| ISSN: | 2284936X 22849378 |
| DOI: | 10.53477/2284-9378-25-52 |