Analysis of reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes
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| Title: | Analysis of reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes |
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| Authors: | P. Santini, M. Battaglioni, F. Chiaraluce, M. Baldi |
| Contributors: | M. Baldi, E. Persichetti, P. Santini (Eds.), Santini, P., Battaglioni, M., Chiaraluce, F., Baldi, M. |
| Publisher Information: | Springer Nature Switzerland, Cham |
| Publication Year: | 2019 |
| Collection: | Università Politecnica delle Marche: IRIS |
| Subject Terms: | Code-based cryptosystems, LDPC codes, MDPC codes, reaction attacks, timing attacks |
| Description: | In this paper we study reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes, which encompass low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes and moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes. We show that the feasibility of these attacks is not strictly associated to the quasi-cyclic (QC) structure of the code but is related to the intrinsically probabilistic decoding of any sparse parity-check code. So, these attacks not only work against QC codes, but can be generalized to broader classes of codes. We provide a novel algorithm that, in the case of a QC code, allows recovering a larger amount of information than that retrievable through existing attacks and we use this algorithm to characterize new side-channel information leakages. We devise a theoretical model for the decoder that describes and justifies our results. Numerical simulations are provided that confirm the effectiveness of our approach. |
| Document Type: | conference object |
| File Description: | ELETTRONICO |
| Language: | English |
| Relation: | info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/isbn/978-3-030-25921-1; info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/wos/WOS:000788008500007; ispartofseries:LNCS; ispartofbook:Proc. CBC 2019; 7th International Workshop on Code-Based Cryptography; volume:11666; firstpage:115; lastpage:136; numberofpages:22; https://hdl.handle.net/11566/269335 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-030-25922-8_7 |
| Availability: | https://hdl.handle.net/11566/269335 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25922-8_7 |
| Accession Number: | edsbas.EA220AE1 |
| Database: | BASE |
Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science | Abstract: | In this paper we study reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes, which encompass low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes and moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes. We show that the feasibility of these attacks is not strictly associated to the quasi-cyclic (QC) structure of the code but is related to the intrinsically probabilistic decoding of any sparse parity-check code. So, these attacks not only work against QC codes, but can be generalized to broader classes of codes. We provide a novel algorithm that, in the case of a QC code, allows recovering a larger amount of information than that retrievable through existing attacks and we use this algorithm to characterize new side-channel information leakages. We devise a theoretical model for the decoder that describes and justifies our results. Numerical simulations are provided that confirm the effectiveness of our approach. |
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| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-030-25922-8_7 |