'Go Easy on Me!' Supervisor Discretion in Target Setting after Managerial Turnover
Gespeichert in:
| Titel: | 'Go Easy on Me!' Supervisor Discretion in Target Setting after Managerial Turnover |
|---|---|
| Autoren: | Verschaeve, Mathilde, Cardinaels, Eddy, Smeulders, Dieter, Van den Abbeele, Alexandra |
| Quelle: | Journal of Management Accounting Research. :1-28 |
| Verlagsinformationen: | American Accounting Association, 2025. |
| Publikationsjahr: | 2025 |
| Schlagwörter: | relative target setting, 3501 Accounting, auditing and accountability, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, INFORMATION, supervisor discretion, SLACK, peer performance informa tion, FIRMS, Social Sciences, BONUSES, 1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, Business, Finance, managerial turnover, Business & Economics, DIFFICULTY, MORAL HAZARD, MANAGEMENT, target ratcheting, target setting |
| Beschreibung: | This paper examines supervisors’ target setting decisions following managerial turnover, an event largely overlooked in prior studies. Specifically, we test whether regional supervisors use discretion to assign different target levels to new managers compared to those who remain in their business unit. Moreover, we investigate whether the use of past performance and peer performance information in supervisors’ target revisions is sensitive to managerial turnover. Using field data from 113 nursing homes of a large elderly care provider over a three-year period, we provide evidence that supervisors assign relatively lower targets to new managers. Additionally, our results show that, overall, supervisors rely on past and peer performance information to a similar extent when revising targets for new managers, with a more lenient approach if new managers underperform. Our findings suggest that current knowledge about target setting may be incomplete, as supervisors may treat new managers differently. Data Availability: All data are proprietary and protected by a nondisclosure agreement. |
| Publikationsart: | Article |
| Sprache: | English |
| ISSN: | 1558-8033 1049-2127 |
| DOI: | 10.2308/jmar-2024-037 |
| Zugangs-URL: | https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/20.500.12942/772948 https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2024-037 |
| Dokumentencode: | edsair.doi.dedup.....9edcf54e00b47c3b029ff1effdd8277f |
| Datenbank: | OpenAIRE |
Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science | Abstract: | This paper examines supervisors’ target setting decisions following managerial turnover, an event largely overlooked in prior studies. Specifically, we test whether regional supervisors use discretion to assign different target levels to new managers compared to those who remain in their business unit. Moreover, we investigate whether the use of past performance and peer performance information in supervisors’ target revisions is sensitive to managerial turnover. Using field data from 113 nursing homes of a large elderly care provider over a three-year period, we provide evidence that supervisors assign relatively lower targets to new managers. Additionally, our results show that, overall, supervisors rely on past and peer performance information to a similar extent when revising targets for new managers, with a more lenient approach if new managers underperform. Our findings suggest that current knowledge about target setting may be incomplete, as supervisors may treat new managers differently. Data Availability: All data are proprietary and protected by a nondisclosure agreement. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 15588033 10492127 |
| DOI: | 10.2308/jmar-2024-037 |