Performance contests and merit pay with empathic employees
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| Názov: | Performance contests and merit pay with empathic employees |
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| Autori: | Fabel, Oliver, Mauser, Sandra, Zhang, Yingchao |
| Zdroj: | Managerial and Decision Economics. 45:353-372 |
| Informácie o vydavateľovi: | Wiley, 2023. |
| Rok vydania: | 2023 |
| Predmety: | 502026 Human resource management, Competition, Strategy and Management, 502026 Personalmanagement, 05 social sciences, Gap, Tournaments, Management Science and Operations Research, Altruism, Gender-differences, Affirmative-action, Management of Technology and Innovation, Preferences, Incentives, 0502 economics and business, Pressure, Women, Business and International Management, 10. No inequality |
| Popis: | This paper studies the behavioral responses of employees who are endowed with empathic abilities to different institutional designs of incentive pay. Empathic abilities motivate altruistic behavior by sensing the other's feelings toward oneself. In performance contests, empathic individuals withhold effort, most (less) strongly when facing a non‐empathic (empathic) contestant. Effort levels of both non‐empathic and empathic individuals increase with a higher probability that the contestant is of their own type. By developing a theoretical model, our analysis contributes to understanding observed individual behavior in experiments and corresponding econometric evidence. With direct merit pay, effort choices only depend on the signaling quality of the performance measure. Individuals with stronger empathic abilities may shy away from performance contests to, instead, receive merit pay. If gender governs empathic abilities, setting incentives by performance contests cannot simultaneously ensure equal pay and equal opportunities. |
| Druh dokumentu: | Article |
| Popis súboru: | application/pdf |
| Jazyk: | English |
| ISSN: | 1099-1468 0143-6570 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/mde.4003 |
| Prístupová URL adresa: | https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/6c0d584e-a94f-456d-8887-315d6722fcab https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4003 |
| Rights: | CC BY |
| Prístupové číslo: | edsair.doi.dedup.....88e86f9b3afb25f8af7bf5c4d024010a |
| Databáza: | OpenAIRE |
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Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science | Abstrakt: | This paper studies the behavioral responses of employees who are endowed with empathic abilities to different institutional designs of incentive pay. Empathic abilities motivate altruistic behavior by sensing the other's feelings toward oneself. In performance contests, empathic individuals withhold effort, most (less) strongly when facing a non‐empathic (empathic) contestant. Effort levels of both non‐empathic and empathic individuals increase with a higher probability that the contestant is of their own type. By developing a theoretical model, our analysis contributes to understanding observed individual behavior in experiments and corresponding econometric evidence. With direct merit pay, effort choices only depend on the signaling quality of the performance measure. Individuals with stronger empathic abilities may shy away from performance contests to, instead, receive merit pay. If gender governs empathic abilities, setting incentives by performance contests cannot simultaneously ensure equal pay and equal opportunities. |
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| ISSN: | 10991468 01436570 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/mde.4003 |