Epistemic Blame and Epistemic Business
Saved in:
| Title: | Epistemic Blame and Epistemic Business |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Cunningham, Alexandra |
| Contributors: | Fantl, Jeremy, Haji, Ishtiyaque, Delehanty, Megan, PRISM |
| Publisher Information: | 2022. |
| Publication Year: | 2022 |
| Subject Terms: | Ethics, Social epistemology, Standing to blame, Epistemology, Business condition, Epistemic blame |
| Description: | This thesis concerns our standing to epistemically blame. We have reason to think three claims hold true: (1) we only have the standing to epistemically blame when it’s our epistemic business, (2) other people’s epistemic errors are rarely our epistemic business, and (3) we often have the standing to epistemically blame. These jointly inconsistent claims generate the puzzle which motivates this thesis. I begin in Chapter II by offering a novel account of epistemic blame. Chapters III and IV represent my argument against the second of the above claims. I argue for two standing conditions on epistemic blame in order to demonstrate that others’ epistemic errors are often our epistemic business. Finally, in Chapter V, I examine a distinctly epistemic conception of hypocrisy to clarify one way in which we can lose the standing to epistemically blame. In sum, this thesis is meant to explain and defend our entitlement to epistemically blame. |
| Document Type: | Master thesis |
| File Description: | application/pdf |
| Language: | English |
| Access URL: | https://hdl.handle.net/1880/114592 |
| Accession Number: | edsair.dedup.wf.002..11a2c3549c5d8b02b3b25db109f5ddf2 |
| Database: | OpenAIRE |
Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science Be the first to leave a comment!