Decentralized Dynamic Heterogeneous Redundancy Architecture Based on Raft Consensus Algorithm.
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| Titel: | Decentralized Dynamic Heterogeneous Redundancy Architecture Based on Raft Consensus Algorithm. |
|---|---|
| Autoren: | Chen, Ke, Shi, Leyi |
| Quelle: | Future Internet; Jan2026, Vol. 18 Issue 1, p20, 25p |
| Schlagwörter: | COMPUTER network security, DECENTRALIZED control systems, RESEARCH evaluation, CONSENSUS (Social sciences), FAULT tolerance (Engineering), FAULT-tolerant computing |
| Abstract: | Dynamic heterogeneous redundancy (DHR) architectures combine heterogeneity, redundancy, and dynamism to create security-centric frameworks that can be used to mitigate network attacks that exploit unknown vulnerabilities. However, conventional DHR architectures rely on centralized control modules for scheduling and adjudication, leading to significant single-point failure risks and trust bottlenecks that severely limit their deployment in security-critical scenarios. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a decentralized DHR architecture based on the Raft consensus algorithm. It deeply integrates the Raft consensus mechanism with the DHR execution layer to build a consensus-centric control plane and designs a dual-log pipeline to ensure all security-critical decisions are executed only after global consistency via Raft. Furthermore, we define a multi-dimensional attacker model—covering external, internal executor, internal node, and collaborative Byzantine adversaries—to analyze the security properties and explicit defense boundaries of the architecture under Raft's crash-fault-tolerant assumptions. To assess the effectiveness of the proposed architecture, a prototype consisting of five heterogeneous nodes was developed for thorough evaluation. The experimental results show that, for non-Byzantine external and internal attacks, the architecture achieves high detection and isolation rates, maintains high availability, and ensures state consistency among non-malicious nodes. For stress tests in which a minority of nodes exhibit Byzantine-like behavior, our prototype preserves log consistency and prevents incorrect state commitments; however, we explicitly treat these as empirical observations under a restricted adversary rather than a general Byzantine fault tolerance guarantee. Performance testing revealed that the system exhibits strong security resilience in attack scenarios, with manageable performance overhead. Instead of turning Raft into a Byzantine-fault-tolerant consensus protocol, the proposed architecture preserves Raft's crash-fault-tolerant guarantees at the consensus layer and achieves Byzantine-resilient behavior at the execution layer through heterogeneous redundant executors and majority-hash validation. To support evaluation during peer review, we provide a runnable prototype package containing Docker-based deployment scripts, pre-built heterogeneous executors, and Raft control-plane images, enabling reviewers to observe and assess the representative architectural behaviors of the system under controlled configurations without exposing the internal source code. The complete implementation will be made available after acceptance in accordance with institutional IP requirements, without affecting the scope or validity of the current evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Datenbank: | Complementary Index |
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