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Overfull: Too Large Aggregate Signatures Based on Lattices.

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Název: Overfull: Too Large Aggregate Signatures Based on Lattices.
Autoři: Boudgoust, Katharina, Roux-Langlois, Adeline
Zdroj: Computer Journal; Feb2024, Vol. 67 Issue 2, p719-727, 9p
Témata: RESEARCH questions, CRYPTOGRAPHY, TECHNICAL institutes, HARDNESS, STANDARDIZATION
Abstrakt: The Fiat-Shamir with Aborts paradigm of Lyubashevsky has given rise to efficient lattice-based signature schemes. One popular implementation is Dilithium, which has been selected for standardization by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Informally, it can be seen as a lattice analog of the well-known discrete-logarithm-based Schnorr signature. An interesting research question is whether it is possible to combine several unrelated signatures, issued from different signing parties on different messages, into one single aggregated signature. Of course, its size should be significantly smaller than the trivial concatenation of all signatures. Ideally, the aggregation can be done offline by a third party, called public aggregation. Previous works have shown that it is possible to half-aggregate Schnorr signatures, but it was left open if the underlying techniques can be adapted to the lattice setting. In this work, we show that, indeed, we can use similar strategies to obtain a signature scheme allowing for public aggregation whose hardness is proven assuming the intractability of well-studied problems on module lattices. Unfortunately, our scheme produces aggregated signatures that are larger than the trivial solution of concatenating. This is due to peculiarities that seem inherent to lattice-based cryptography. Its motivation is thus mainly pedagogical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Computer Journal is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: Overfull: Too Large Aggregate Signatures Based on Lattices.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Boudgoust%2C+Katharina%22">Boudgoust, Katharina</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Roux-Langlois%2C+Adeline%22">Roux-Langlois, Adeline</searchLink>
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  Data: Computer Journal; Feb2024, Vol. 67 Issue 2, p719-727, 9p
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22RESEARCH+questions%22">RESEARCH questions</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22CRYPTOGRAPHY%22">CRYPTOGRAPHY</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22TECHNICAL+institutes%22">TECHNICAL institutes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22HARDNESS%22">HARDNESS</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22STANDARDIZATION%22">STANDARDIZATION</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: The Fiat-Shamir with Aborts paradigm of Lyubashevsky has given rise to efficient lattice-based signature schemes. One popular implementation is Dilithium, which has been selected for standardization by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Informally, it can be seen as a lattice analog of the well-known discrete-logarithm-based Schnorr signature. An interesting research question is whether it is possible to combine several unrelated signatures, issued from different signing parties on different messages, into one single aggregated signature. Of course, its size should be significantly smaller than the trivial concatenation of all signatures. Ideally, the aggregation can be done offline by a third party, called public aggregation. Previous works have shown that it is possible to half-aggregate Schnorr signatures, but it was left open if the underlying techniques can be adapted to the lattice setting. In this work, we show that, indeed, we can use similar strategies to obtain a signature scheme allowing for public aggregation whose hardness is proven assuming the intractability of well-studied problems on module lattices. Unfortunately, our scheme produces aggregated signatures that are larger than the trivial solution of concatenating. This is due to peculiarities that seem inherent to lattice-based cryptography. Its motivation is thus mainly pedagogical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
– Name: Abstract
  Label:
  Group: Ab
  Data: <i>Copyright of Computer Journal is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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        Value: 10.1093/comjnl/bxad013
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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        PageCount: 9
        StartPage: 719
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      – SubjectFull: RESEARCH questions
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: CRYPTOGRAPHY
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: TECHNICAL institutes
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      – SubjectFull: HARDNESS
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      – TitleFull: Overfull: Too Large Aggregate Signatures Based on Lattices.
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            NameFull: Boudgoust, Katharina
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              Text: Feb2024
              Type: published
              Y: 2024
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