View in EDS

A Double Auction Mechanism to Bridge Users? Task Requirements and Providers? Resources in Two-Sided Cloud Markets.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: A Double Auction Mechanism to Bridge Users? Task Requirements and Providers? Resources in Two-Sided Cloud Markets.
Authors: Lu, Li1, Yu, Jiadi1, Zhu, Yanmin1, Li, Minglu1
Source: IEEE Transactions on Parallel & Distributed Systems. Apr2018, Vol. 29 Issue 4, p720-733. 14p.
Subject Terms: *CLOUD computing, *RESOURCE allocation, *MATHEMATICAL models of pricing, *INFORMATION resources, *ALGORITHMS, *COMPUTER simulation
Abstract: Double auction-based pricing model is an efficient pricing model to balance users’ and providers’ benefits. Existing double auction mechanisms usually require both users and providers to bid with the unit price and the number of VMs. However, in practice users seldom know the exact number of VMs that meets their task requirements, which leads to users’ task requirements inconsistent with providers’ resource. In this paper, we propose a truthful double auction mechanism, including a matching process as well as a pricing and VM allocation scheme, to bridge users’ task requirements and providers’ resources in two-sided cloud markets. In the matching process, we design a cost-aware resource algorithm based on Lyapunov optimization techniques to precisely obtain the number of VMs that meets users’ task requirements. In the pricing and VM allocation scheme, we apply the idea of second-price auction to determine the final price and the number of provisioned VMs in the double auction. We theoretically prove our proposed mechanism is individual-rational, truthful and budget-balanced, and analyze the optimality of proposed algorithm. Through simulation experiments, the results show that the individual profits achieved by our algorithm are 12.35 and 11.02 percent larger than that of scale-out and greedy scale-up algorithms respectively for 90 percent of users, and the social welfare of our mechanism is only 7.01 percent smaller than that of the optimum mechanism in the worst case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Database: Academic Search Index
FullText Text:
  Availability: 0
CustomLinks:
  – Url: https://resolver.ebscohost.com/openurl?sid=EBSCO:asx&genre=article&issn=10459219&ISBN=&volume=29&issue=4&date=20180401&spage=720&pages=720-733&title=IEEE Transactions on Parallel & Distributed Systems&atitle=A%20Double%20Auction%20Mechanism%20to%20Bridge%20Users%3F%20Task%20Requirements%20and%20Providers%3F%20Resources%20in%20Two-Sided%20Cloud%20Markets.&aulast=Lu%2C%20Li&id=DOI:10.1109/TPDS.2017.2781236
    Name: Full Text Finder
    Category: fullText
    Text: Full Text Finder
    Icon: https://imageserver.ebscohost.com/branding/images/FTF.gif
    MouseOverText: Full Text Finder
  – Url: https://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=EBSCO&SrcAuth=EBSCO&DestApp=WOS&ServiceName=TransferToWoS&DestLinkType=GeneralSearchSummary&Func=Links&author=Lu%20L
    Name: ISI
    Category: fullText
    Text: Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science
    Icon: https://imagesrvr.epnet.com/ls/20docs.gif
    MouseOverText: Nájsť tento článok vo Web of Science
Header DbId: asx
DbLabel: Academic Search Index
An: 128463149
RelevancyScore: 1243
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 1243.44189453125
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: A Double Auction Mechanism to Bridge Users? Task Requirements and Providers? Resources in Two-Sided Cloud Markets.
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Lu%2C+Li%22">Lu, Li</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Yu%2C+Jiadi%22">Yu, Jiadi</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Zhu%2C+Yanmin%22">Zhu, Yanmin</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Li%2C+Minglu%22">Li, Minglu</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22IEEE+Transactions+on+Parallel+%26+Distributed+Systems%22">IEEE Transactions on Parallel & Distributed Systems</searchLink>. Apr2018, Vol. 29 Issue 4, p720-733. 14p.
– Name: Subject
  Label: Subject Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22CLOUD+computing%22">CLOUD computing</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22RESOURCE+allocation%22">RESOURCE allocation</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22MATHEMATICAL+models+of+pricing%22">MATHEMATICAL models of pricing</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22INFORMATION+resources%22">INFORMATION resources</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22ALGORITHMS%22">ALGORITHMS</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22COMPUTER+simulation%22">COMPUTER simulation</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: Double auction-based pricing model is an efficient pricing model to balance users’ and providers’ benefits. Existing double auction mechanisms usually require both users and providers to bid with the unit price and the number of VMs. However, in practice users seldom know the exact number of VMs that meets their task requirements, which leads to users’ task requirements inconsistent with providers’ resource. In this paper, we propose a truthful double auction mechanism, including a matching process as well as a pricing and VM allocation scheme, to bridge users’ task requirements and providers’ resources in two-sided cloud markets. In the matching process, we design a cost-aware resource algorithm based on Lyapunov optimization techniques to precisely obtain the number of VMs that meets users’ task requirements. In the pricing and VM allocation scheme, we apply the idea of second-price auction to determine the final price and the number of provisioned VMs in the double auction. We theoretically prove our proposed mechanism is individual-rational, truthful and budget-balanced, and analyze the optimality of proposed algorithm. Through simulation experiments, the results show that the individual profits achieved by our algorithm are 12.35 and 11.02 percent larger than that of scale-out and greedy scale-up algorithms respectively for 90 percent of users, and the social welfare of our mechanism is only 7.01 percent smaller than that of the optimum mechanism in the worst case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
PLink https://erproxy.cvtisr.sk/sfx/access?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=asx&AN=128463149
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1109/TPDS.2017.2781236
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 14
        StartPage: 720
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: CLOUD computing
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: RESOURCE allocation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: MATHEMATICAL models of pricing
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: INFORMATION resources
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: ALGORITHMS
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: COMPUTER simulation
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: A Double Auction Mechanism to Bridge Users? Task Requirements and Providers? Resources in Two-Sided Cloud Markets.
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Lu, Li
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Yu, Jiadi
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Zhu, Yanmin
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Li, Minglu
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 04
              Text: Apr2018
              Type: published
              Y: 2018
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 10459219
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 29
            – Type: issue
              Value: 4
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: IEEE Transactions on Parallel & Distributed Systems
              Type: main
ResultId 1